Out of Control – Hong Kong’s Rebellious Movement and the Left
失控 – 香港的反抗運動與左翼
by Ralf Ruckus
This article is the result of recent discussions with protesters and left-wing activists in Hong Kong. It gives a short overview of the escalated confrontation and argues that the broad ignorance of the global left is a mistake. Despite its limitations, the movement constitutes a major challenge for the right-wing regime of China’s Communist Party (CCP) and could be the prelude for more struggles against the capitalist relations in Hong Kong, the People’s Republic of China, and elsewhere.
Massive demonstrations, rallies, violent clashes, tear gas and water cannons, burning barricades, attacks on police stations, blockades of streets and subway lines, strikes, and more – these are the dramatic forms of the current mass movement in Hong Kong. It expanded in June 2019 in reaction to a planned extradition bill which would have allowed handing over alleged criminals to mainland China’s repressive forces. Until September, the movement has escalated into the most serious social confrontation in Hong Kong since the riots against British colonial rule in 1967. And, as Hong Kong has been a semi-autonomous part of China with certain ‘democratic freedoms’ since the city was handed over by Britain to China in 1997, the escalation of the conflict also constitutes a serious challenge for the CCP regime.
大規模的示威活動、集會、暴力衝突、催淚彈和水炮、燃燒的路障、襲擊警署、封鎖街道和地鐵線路、罷工等等 – 這些都是當前香港群眾運動的戲劇性形式。 它在2019年6月擴大了對計劃推動的引渡法案的反應，該法案允許將疑犯罪移交給中國大陸的鎮壓性執法部門。到九月，這場運動已經升級為自1967年反對英國殖民統治的騷亂以來，香港最嚴重的社會對抗。而且，由於香港已成為中國的一個半自治的部分，自1997年英國移交給中國，香港享有一定程度的「民主自由」。 衝突升級也對中共政權構成了嚴峻挑戰。
Western politicians (and mainstream media critical of the CCP) describe the movement simply as one “for democracy and freedom” – and even ignore its violent tactics or call it simply a reaction to police violence. They see China’s global expansion politics as a threat to their own economic and political interests and want to use this chance to weaken China’s position and influence. The Western liberal and institutional left repeats the “democracy and freedom” hymn in the same way it usually defends the interests of national capitalist regimes using human rights arguments. That a part of the orthodox left has expressed support for the position of the CCP regime, instead, is also no surprise considering its outdated ‘anti-imperialist’ reflexes and lack of understanding of the capitalist nature of the CCP.
西方政客（以及對中共持批判態度的主流媒體）將這一運動簡單地稱為對「民主與自由」的爭取 – 甚至忽視其暴力抗爭策略，或稱其僅僅是對警察暴力的反應。 他們認為中共的全球擴張政治是對他們自身經濟和政治利益的威脅，並希望藉此機會削弱中共的地位和影響力。 西方自由主義和制度左派重複了「民主與自由」的讚美詩，就像它通常使用人權論證來維護國家資本主義政權的利益一樣。 相反地，一部分正統左派表達了支持中共政權的立場，考慮到其過時的「反帝國主義」條件反射式反應和對中共資本主義性質缺乏了解，也不足為奇。
The important question is why the anti-capitalist left has been largely silent and inactive regarding the escalation of the conflict in Hong Kong. Is it being blinded by the mainstream reporting and does not want to support a mere ‘democracy’ movement? Is it believing the claims of orthodox leftists that China is still ‘socialist’? Is it deterred by the nationalist and racist discourses or requests for help from the U. S. government of parts of the Hong Kong movement? Or is Hong Kong – which has no long history of bigger and explicitly left-wing political movements – simply outside the radar of the anti-capitalist left and ‘too far away’ to even bother?
重要的問題是，為什麼反資本主義左派在香港衝突升級時，大部份仍保持沉默和不作為。 它是否被主流報導所蒙蔽，並不想支持一個只是為「民主」的運動？是否相信正統左翼分子所聲稱中國仍然是「社會主義」？它是否受到香港這運動中部份的民族主義和種族主義話語或要求美國政府幫助而卻步？還是因為香港沒有大規模和明確的左翼政治運動的悠久歷史 – 只是不在外間反資本主義左翼的觀測之外，和「太遠」關心不了？
The point to be made is that the current confrontation between the protest movement and the governments in Hong Kong and China constitutes an important historical rupture. A look at the different phases of the movement’s development reveals that it a) has come up with radical forms of movement and struggle, b) has broken the existing social consensus on the relation of Hong Kong’s population, government and police, and c) threatens to destroy Hong Kong’s role for China’s (and global) capitalism.
The outcome of the confrontation is still open, but the anti-capitalist left should thoroughly analyze the development and support those currents within the movement that have a progressive potential.
The movement in Hong Kong makes use of the experiences of previous mobilizations since the handover in 1997, namely the Umbrella Movement in 2014 when tens of thousands demanded “free elections” in Hong Kong from China’s regime and occupied a large space outside Hong Kong’s parliament for several weeks – before they were pushed aside without having reached their goal.
香港的運動利用了自一九九七年回歸後的先前運動經驗，即2014年的雨傘運動，那時數以萬計的人要求中共政權在香港進行「自由選舉」，他們好幾個星期佔領香港議會外圍的空間 – 在沒有達到目標的情況下被推到一旁。
The first phase of the current mobilization began in February 2019 with the Hong Kong government’s announcement of the extradition bill. A public outcry and several peaceful demonstrations followed.
As the government did not stop the proceedings to introduce the bill, a second phase started on June 9. Several mass demonstrations with up to two million participants in the center of Hong Kong – surprising if we consider a city population of just 7.5 million – were followed by major clashes with the police using tear gas, rubber bullets, and bean-bag rounds against demonstrators building barricades and throwing objects at the charging police forces. The Hong Kong government suspended the bill on June 15, but without withdrawing it. By then, the Hong Kong government had already lost all the trust of large parts of the Hong Kong population.
由於政府沒有停止提出法案的程序，第二階段於6月9日開始。  在香港的中心地帶舉行了多次大規模示威遊行，參與人數高達200萬 – 考慮到這城市只有750萬人口，這令人驚訝 – 隨後與警方發生重大衝突，警方使用了催淚彈，橡膠子彈和布袋彈，以對抗示威者建造的路障及向進攻的警隊投擲物品。 香港政府於6月15日暫緩了該法案，但並未撤回。  到那時，香港政府已經失去了大部分香港人的信任。
The movement formulated five demands: 1) the complete withdrawal of the extradition bill, 2) the withdrawal of the ‘riot’ charge against protesters, 3) the release of arrested protesters and the drop of charges against them, 4) an independent inquiry into police violence, and 5) the implementation of genuine universal suffrage (sometimes also the resignation of Hong Kong government leader Carrie Lam). The second phase ended on July 1, when during a large demonstration hundreds of militants broke into the parliament building and ransacked it.
運動提出了五大訴求：1）完全撤回引渡條例法案; 2）撤銷對抗議者的「暴動」定性，3）釋放被捕的示威者並不對他們提出起訴，4）就警察暴力進行獨立調查，以及5）實施真正的普選（有時也會是香港政府領導人林鄭月娥的辭職）。 第二階段於7月1日結束，在一次大型示威當中，數百名示威者闖入議會大樓並將其破壞。
In the third phase, the movement decided to spread to other city areas. These actions were meant to take the protests to other parts of the Hong Kong population but also to outreach to mainland visitors and immigrants to explain the movement’s demands. They drew smaller numbers as before until the situation changed again on July 21, when hundreds of men in ‘white shirts’ from local (pro-CCP) triads attacked and injured homecoming protesters in a suburban subway station. The obvious collaboration of police and triads during the attack led to public outrage. The police itself became the focus of anger and hatred of large parts of the Hong Kong population, and a spiral of increasingly violent action and counter-action began. Surprisingly, the violent attacks by protesters on the police have so far been supported (or, at least, tolerated) by the bigger part of the movement as it became obvious that the government hardly reacted to ‘peaceful’ demonstrations.
在第三階段，運動決定擴散到其他地區。 這些行動的目的是將抗議活動帶到香港的其他地區的人口，同時向內地遊客和移民進行宣傳解釋運動的要求。 他們比較之前，吸引到較小的人參與，直到7月21日情況再次發生變化，數百名來自當地（親中共）三合會的“白衫”男子在郊區地鐵站襲擊並傷害了回家的示威者。 警察和黑社會在襲擊期間的明顯合作引起了公憤。 警方本身成為大部分香港人憤怒和仇恨的焦點，並開始出現越來越暴力的行動和反擊行動。 令人驚訝的是，到目前為止，示威者對警方使用的武力得到了運動中大部分的支持（或者至少可以容忍），因為很明顯政府幾乎沒有對「和平」示威作出回應。 ] 
The protesters further changed tactics using ‘flash mob’-like actions by blocking roads, setting up barricades, etc. in one part of city, then using the subway to move to other parts to do the same there, always trying to be ahead of the police – a tactic self-described as “be water” (referring to a Bruce Lee quote). Meanwhile, the police upgraded its equipment and tactics, with more protective gear, new weaponry, undercover cops posing as protesters, and more flexible and aggressive attacks. The height of this phase was August 5, when a strike call was followed by hundreds of thousands, the subway was brought to a halt, and mass demonstrations including coordinated attacks on several police stations took place. Then the demonstrators shifted their attention to the airport, a central and economically important traffic hub not just for the city but for the whole region. It was partially shut down on August 12 and 13.
示威者通過在城市的一個地方佔領道路，設置路障等，然後利用地鐵轉移到其他地方做同樣的事情，使用「快閃」行動進一步改變策略，總是試圖快警察一步 – 一種自我形容為「像水一樣」的策略（參照李小龍的話）。 與此同時，警方升級了裝備和戰術，增加了更多的防護裝備、新武器，警員喬裝為示威者，以及更具靈活性和侵略性的攻擊。 這一階段的高峰是8月5日，當時有數十萬人響應了罷工呼籲，地鐵的運作被癱瘓，群眾示威活動包括對幾個警察局的協同攻擊。   然後示威者將他們的注意力轉移到了機場，這是一個對於香港及整個地區都具中心和經濟上重要地位的交通樞紐。 在8月12日和13日，它的運作被部分地癱瘓。
The forth (and ongoing) phase began with the movement’s decision to halt the violent clashes and regroup its forces. Peaceful demonstrations on August 17 and 18, the latter with 1.7 million participants, showed the still massive support of the movement, as did the human chain action (inspired by a similar action in the Baltic states in 1989) of several hundreds of thousands on August 23.
As the government still made no concessions, the violent clashes have returned on August 24 and after. The police have ordered the subway authority to shut down stations in protest areas, continued to use tear gas, rubber bullets, and brutal baton attacks, and recently started to employ water cannons. The protesters have used Molotov cocktails, set fire to barricades, ransacked subway stations, and blocked train services and roads to the airport. On September 2, university and high-school students returned to school after the summer break and started strike actions. On September 4, Carrie Lam actually fulfilled the first demand and withdrew the extradition bill, but so far that has not stopped further clashes.
由於政府依然沒有作出任何讓步，暴力衝突於8月24日及之後再次發生。警方下令地鐵當局關閉示威行動的地區附近的車站，繼續使用催淚彈、橡膠子彈和殘暴的警棍襲擊，最近更開始使用水炮。  示威者使用莫洛托夫雞尾酒，放火焚燒路障，破壞地鐵站， 並阻礙通往機場的列車服務和道路。  9月2日，大學生和中學生在暑假結束後返回學校並開始罷課行動。  9月4日，林鄭月娥實際上回應了第一個訴求並撤回了引渡法案，但到目前為止還未能停止進一步的衝突。 
Why did the movement escalate from peaceful marches to bring down a bill to a massive and partially violent movement that targets the police, the position of the Hong Kong government, and the influence of the CCP regime? When Britain and China agreed on the handover and formulated the “Basic Law” as the constitutional document that defined China’s ‘one country, two systems’ rule after 1997, people in Hong Kong and elsewhere believed that it was China that would change and become more democratic in the course of its industrialization, urbanization, and integration into the world-economy. Instead, China has not moved into that direction but has not only tightened its authoritarian repressive rule but also amplified its economic and political interventions in Hong Kong.
為什麼運動會從，為了推倒一條法案的和平游行，升級為一個部分地暴力，針對警察、香港政府的立場、中共政權的影響的大規模運動？ 當英國和中國同意移交並制定「基本法」作為定義1997年後中國「一國兩制」的憲法性文件時，香港和其他地方的人們相信，中國將因為它的工業化、城市化和融入世界經濟的過程中改變和變得更民主。 相反地，中國沒有朝著這個方向發展，更不僅加強了其專制的鎮壓統治，而且加強了對香港的經濟和政治干預。
Today, many people in Hong Kong expect that China will not even wait until 2047, the official end of the ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement. The extradition bill was seen as just one more threat to the relative freedoms of expression and association and the Western style ‘rule of law.’ Protesters see their struggle as an ‘end game,’ the final chance to stop a full takeover and the introduction of an even more repressive regime by China.
Besides, many people in Hong Kong, especially young people, suffer from the immense social inequality in the city, the high rents and relatively low wages, the competition of mainland immigrants for jobs, housing, and welfare. They feel that China’s increasing influence will further worsen their economic situation unless they stop it.
此外，香港很多人，特別是年輕人，都受害於香港嚴重的社會不平等，高昂的租金和相對低的工資，大陸移民對就業、房屋和福利的競爭。   他們認為，中共日益增強的影響力將進一步惡化其經濟形勢，除非他們阻止它。
At least a third of Hong Kong’s population (2.5 million people) have actively taken part in the movement – probably a world record. The movement is heterogeneous, with people of different ages, genders, social positions, and professions involved: high-school and university students, white collar workers, civil servants, airport workers, nurses, and many more. According to surveys, most of the participants are highly educated and rather ‘middle class’ but many blue and pink collar workers are also taking part or simply support it but cannot participate much due to economic pressures and long working hours. Actually, many protesters live in two worlds, a full work schedule during weekdays, and the rebellious movement on the street in the evenings and on weekends. Notable is the general absence of the city’s hundreds of thousands of immigrant female domestic workers from the Philippines and Indonesia.
香港至少有三分之一的人口（250萬人）積極參與這項運動 – 這可能是世界紀錄。 這運動是異質的，涉及不同年齡、性／別、社會地位和職業的人：中學生和大學生、白領、公務員、機場工作人員、護士等等。 根據調查，大多數參與者都受過高等教育，而且頗「中產」，但許多藍領和粉紅領工人也有參與，或由於經濟壓力和長工時而無法參與其中的亦有支持。 實際上，許多示威者生活在兩個世界：工作日的日間工作時間表，以及晚上和周末在街頭的反叛運動。 值得注意的是，普遍地欠缺了數十萬來自菲律賓和印度尼西亞的移民女性家務工在這場運動裡。
The masses of participating young high-school and university students grew up in post-1997 Hong Kong and never developed a ‘Chinese identity.’ They fear the repressive CCP system and want to keep their Hong Kong ‘way of life.' Meanwhile, many of the older protesters are migrants from the mainland or their descendants who suffered from CCP purges or other campaigns before they came to Hong Kong in the past decades. They don’t trust the CCP.
參與的年輕中學生和大學生在1997年後的香港成長，沒有發展出「中國人的身份」。他們擔心壓制性的中共制度，並希望保持他們的香港「生活方式」。 與此同時，許多年長的示威者是來自大陸的移民或他們的後代，他們在過去幾十年來到香港之前曾受苦於中共的清洗或其他運動。 他們並不相信中共。
The protesters are confronted by a smaller part of the population that does, indeed, supports the Hong Kong government and police as well as the CCP and has staged own demonstrations with up to tens of thousands of participants.
The protest movement shows an amazing ability to self-organize, develop and change strategies, and make decisions – despite its massive size. Debates and actions are often organized through forums like (Reddit-like) LIHKG, Telegram and Facebook groups, as well as other digital tools. Sometimes thousands or ten thousands of members use these chat groups, and even decisions on the next step during a demonstration are made using apps. During peaceful and violent actions, people take over certain functions: front-line fighting, building barricades, providing supplies like masks or helmets, offering medical treatment, etc. Others administer the digital communication tools, post information on the location of police squads or PIN-codes for doors in the neighborhood for people to escape, provide visual art work related to the movement, and take care of the ‘Lennon Walls' – posters, stickers, photos, etc. put up on certain walls. Many people also use their own money to buy water, food, subway tickets, or equipment like gas masks and distribute it to demonstrators, or they donate money if they have no other way to support the movement.
運動表現出驚人的自我組織，發展和改變策略以及作出決定的能力 – 盡管其規模極之龐大。   辯論和行動通常通過像（Reddit-like）LIHKG， Telegram和Facebook群組以及其他網上工具這樣的平台進行組織。 有時成千上萬的成員使用這些聊天群組，甚至在示威期間的下一步決策都是使用應用軟件進行的。在和平或暴力行動中，人們會主動進入不同角色：前線戰鬥、建築路障、分發面罩或頭盔等物資、提供救護等。其他人管理網上通訊，發布警察位置或附近社區可逃避追捕的門禁密碼，制作與運動相關的藝朮作品，並照顧連儂牆‘ – 在某些牆壁上張貼的海報，貼紙，照片等。許多人還用自己的錢購買水，食物，地鐵車票或防毒面具等設備並將其分發給示威者，或者如果沒有其他方式支持運動，他們會捐錢。
Striking is the absence of leaders and the weak position of political parties. For the CCP leaders and the Hong Kong government, this is hard to believe. They, as well as Western media, present people from certain ‘democratic’ or ‘localist’ parties (who played a role during the Umbrella Movement) as today’s leaders or representatives, but those are hardly important for the current movement. This absence of leaders is partly a result of the repression after the Umbrella Movement because many outstanding figures were charged and got prison sentences. Another reason are the divisive tactics of Umbrella Movement leaders like those from ‘localist’ (nationalist) groups. There is a wide consensus that leadership conflicts and divisions weakened the Umbrella Movement and should not be repeated.
引人注目的是沒有領導人和政黨的弱勢地位。  對於中共領導人和香港政府來說，這很難相信。 他們以及西方媒體將來自某些「民主」或「本土」主義政黨的人（在雨傘運動中有一定程度的角色）作為今天的領導人或代表，但這些人對於當前的運動來說毫不重要。這種領導人缺席的部分原因是在傘式運動之後的鎮壓，因為許多特出的人物都被起訴及被判入獄。 另一個原因是部份雨傘運動領導者的分裂策略，如「本土主義」（民族主義）團體的那些。 人們普遍認為，領導間的衝突和分裂削弱了雨傘運動，不應再重復。
So the current movement is mostly pushing for the five demands and uses general slogans like “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times” or “Hong Kong, go forward.” More issues have frequently been voiced and discussed, e. g. left-wing demands regarding social inequality or right-wing demands regarding the limitation of mainland immigration or Hong Kong independence. However, the movement stays with the five demands to ensure its unity and push through these common demands first.
The Hong Kong government under Carrie Lam is visibly shaken by the movement but has largely remained in the background. It is clear that the decisions on how to deal with the movement are made in Beijing. After the CCP did not allow any public reporting in mainland media at first, it later changed its course and started to push a nationalist media campaign that portrays the protesters in Hong Kong as “criminals” or “terrorists” who are driven by “foreign black hands” and pursue a “color revolution” against the CCP and China’s national interests. Chinese state media and government representatives have threatened a direct intervention of Chinese security forces, and Chinese anti-riot units of the People’s Armed Police organized public drills in Shenzhen, close to the Hong Kong border. The CCP regime also uses its economic power and put pressure on companies like the airline Cathay Pacific after its employees had openly taken part in protest actions.
林鄭月娥領導下的香港政府明顯還在該運動的震蕩之中，但它基本上只是一個佈景板。明顯地，關於如何應對這一運動的決定是由北京而來。在中共最初不允許任何大陸媒體的報導，到後來改變了方向並開始推動民族主義色彩的媒體運動  ，將香港的示威者描繪為「罪犯」或「恐怖分子」被「外國黑手」所驅使，並對中共和中國的國家利益進行「顏色革命」。    中國國家媒體和政府代表威脅，說中國軍警部隊會進行直接干預，    中國人民武裝警察防暴部隊在接近香港邊境的深圳安排了公開演習。 中共政權還利用其經濟實力，在有員工公開地參與示威行動後，對國泰航空公司等的公司施加壓力。  
The CCP regime wants to undermine the protesters’ legitimacy and weaken the movement as it looks to protect its political and economic interests. Hong Kong plays a vital role for China as well as Chinese and foreign companies as a transitional hub for capital inflows and outflows, investments, and connected financial and legal services. The city is able to play that role because of its special political status, its own currency, and its Western legal system. The protests as well as the ongoing Sino-U.S. trade war already take a toll on Hong Kong’s economy.
為了保護其政治和經濟利益，中共政權試圖破壞示威者的合法性并削弱運動。香港作為中國 以及中外公司資金流入和流出、投資以及相關金融和法律服務的中介，起著至關重要的作用。由於其特殊的政治地位，擁有自己的貨幣和西方的法律制度，香港能夠發揮這一作用。 示威活動以及正在進行的中美貿易戰已經對香港的經濟造成了影響。  
Any direct intervention by the People’s Armed Police or even the army could destroy Hong Kong’s economic function and bring massive economic losses. However, a continuing movement that openly challenges China’s rule in the city and demands more autonomy or even Hong Kong independence undermines the CCP’s authority and could even prove contagious and provoke more social uprisings in China. Despite the CCP propaganda and the nationalist mobilization in China against the Hong Kong protests, mainlanders do, indeed, have different perspectives on the movement.
Therefore, the CCP leadership wants to quickly stop the movement (and the spreading of pictures of burning barricades), at least not later then the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 2019. That might not be possible without increased repression and the direct intervention of Chinese security forces. The CCP regime is nervous as the escalation of the conflict and the inability of the governments in Hong Kong and Beijing to contain and stop it has already led to speculation about a weakened position of the CCP’s leader Xi Jinping.
因此，中共領導層希望迅速制止運動（以及燃燒路障的圖片的傳播），至少不要晚於2019年10月1日中華人民共和國成立70周年記念。 ] 如果沒有更強的鎮壓和中國軍警部隊的直接干預，這或者是不可能的。 中共政權感到緊張，因為衝突的升級，以及香港和北京政府無法遏制和制止沖突，已經導致人們猜測中共領導人習近平的領導地位正在轉弱。
Limits and Potentials
Leftists have shown apparent difficulties in dealing with recent social movements that don’t fit into their expectations, that refuse to be led by leftist representatives, and that include elements that voice politically problematic positions and demands, as, for instance, the Yellow Vests in France and now the movement in Hong Kong. However, the latent racist positions of parts of the Hong Kong movement and its blurred and problematic demand for ‘democracy’ (or for the defense of the status quo) should be a reason for left-wing activists to get involved, resist those positions, and support the movement’s progressive currents – as some in Hong Kong already try to do.
在處理不符合他們期望，拒絕由左翼代表領導，其中包括表達政治上有問題的立場和要求時，左翼表現出他們面對困難，就如，法國的黃背心和現在香港的運動。  然而，香港運動中部分潛在的種族主義立場及其對「民主」（或維持現狀）的模糊和有問題的要求，應該成為左翼行動者參與，抵抗這些立場的原因，並支持運動的進步湧潮 – 正如在香港的一些人正在嘗試做的一樣。
The current movement in Hong Kong is surely one of the most amazing mass mobilizations seen in the past decades. After all, for the CCP it is the biggest challenge by popular protests since the Tian’anmen Movement in 1989 – even if this comparison has its limits due to the changes in China and globally since. It also comes close to some of those during the ‘Arabellion’ in 2010 and 2011.
香港目前的運動無疑是過去幾十年來最令人驚嘆的群眾動員之一。 畢竟，對於中共來說，這是自1989年天安門運動以來，所面臨的群眾抗議活動的最大挑戰 – 即使這種比較因中國和全球的變化而不完全對稱。 它也接近2010年和2011年「亞拉伯叛逆」期間的一些運動。
The movement is, indeed, no anti-capitalist mobilization, yet, but it has questioned the position of the capitalist class that governs (and virtually owns) Hong Kong as well as that of the rulers of the CCP in Beijing. The attacks on the police show that many in the movement have no trust in core state institutions. Strikes and other mobilizations in workplaces (hospitals, the airport, schools and universities, the public sector, etc.) further undermine the acceptance of capitalist relations, or, like one protester said: “Workers don’t work as hard as usual and speak up against managers now.”
事實上，這場運動暫非反資本主義的動員，但它質疑了管理（並且几乎擁有）香港的資產階級以及在北京的中共統治者的地位。 對警方的襲擊表明，運動中的許多人對核心國家機搆的不信任。 工作場所（醫院、機場、學校和大學、公共部門等）的罷工和其他動員進一步削弱了對資本主義關系的接受，或者像一名抗議者所說「工人不像往常一樣努力工作並會對經理說出反對聲音。」
What will happen next? In a pessimistic scenario, it could end up just like most of them, in a crackdown and defeat, as the Hong Kong government is already talking about declaring a state of emergency, and the CCP seems unable to find a smooth solution and might mobilize its security forces to crush the movement.
接下來會發生什麼？在一個悲觀的情況下，由於香港政府已經在談論宣布進入緊急狀態，而中共似乎無法找到順利的解決方案，並且可能動員其軍警部隊粉碎這場運動。  它可能最終像大多數一樣，在鎮壓和失敗中結束。
In a less dramatic scenario, the movement might just run out of steam. In that case harsher repression measures and many more arrests are still likely as they already have begun. At least some of the ‘democratic freedoms’ in Hong Kong might be kept, which could be seen as a success of the movement. Many in the Western left underestimate the importance of these ‘freedoms’ for organizing resistance and social movements. So far, Hong Kong has been a haven for labor groups, feminists, and other left-wing activists who have used the city to organize activities across the border in China, and any serious crackdown by the CCP regime in Hong Kong could mean they have to stop.
在不那麼戲劇性的情況下，運動可能會逐漸失去動力。在這種情況下，更嚴厲的鎮壓措施和更多的逮捕仍然可能及已經開始。   至少可能保留香港的一些「民主自由」，這可以被看作是運動的成功。 西方左翼的許多人低估了這些「自由」對於組織抵抗和社會運動的重要性。到目前為止，香港一直是勞工團體、女性主義者和其他左翼行動者的溫床，他們利用這個城市在中國境內組織活動，任何中共政權在香港的嚴厲打擊都可能意味著他們需要停止活動。
In an optimistic scenario, the movement could be the beginning of a rebellious generation and further social struggles. The underlying social issues that large parts of the population face (high rents, low wages, long working hours, social inequality, low quality of health care, etc.) could spark anti-capitalist currents, and the experience of collectively standing up and struggle against powerful state authorities might be just the start of more struggles to come that question the capitalist relations as such. That could trigger similar movements in mainland China which face the same enemy – the right-wing CCP regime that has been at the center of the capitalist restoration in China for decades and engaged in a highly repressive drive against left-wing activists in the past few years.
在一個樂觀的情景中，這場運動可能是叛逆的一代和進一步的社會鬥爭的開始。 大部分人所面對的潛在社會問題（高租金、低工資、長工時、社會不平等，醫療質量低等）可能引發反資本主義潮流，另外，集體地反對強大的國家機器的鬥爭的經驗，可能是更多質疑當下資本主義關系這個問題的鬥爭的開始。 這可能引發在中國大陸內面臨同樣敵人的類似運動 – 右翼中共政權幾十年來一直處於中國資本主義復闢的中心，並在過去幾年中大力鎮壓左翼行動者。
Much depends on the limitation the CCP’s influence in Hong Kong and the containment of the right-wing ‘localists’ and their nationalist and racist polices in the city. The involvement of left-wing activists, the promotion of anti-capitalist topics and debates, and even the support from left-wing movements abroad could play a decisive role in making the last scenario more likely.